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Case No. 20090793-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.
VERBERY ADAMS,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his conviction for one count of attempted murder with
injury, a first degree felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-102(2)(a), 765-203(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008). The Utah Supreme Court poured the case over to
this Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j)
(West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. In a pretrial ruling before this bench trial, did the trial court abuse its
discretion in ruling that evidence of Defendant's 1995 murder conviction for
killing another with a car was admissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence?
Standard of Review. This Court will "'review a trial court's decision to
admit evidence under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence under an abuse

of discretion standard/"

State v. Verde, 2010 UT App 30, | 14, 227 P.3d 840

(quoting State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, % 19, 219 R3d 75). "In doing so," this
Court will "'review the record to determine whether the admission of other bad
acts evidence was scrupulously examined by the trial judge in the proper
exercise of that discretion/" Id.
2.

Did the trial court plainly err by allowing the State to introduce

evidence of Defendant's prior conviction during its case-in-chief, when the
pretrial rule 404(b) ruling admitting that evidence placed no conditions on when
it could be admitted?
Standard of Review.

" T o prevail under plain error review, a defendant

must demonstrate that [1] an error exists; [2] the error should have been obvious
to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome/" State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App
50, % 4, 228 P.3d 1255 (quoting State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, H 19-20, 192 P.3d 867)
(alterations in original).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
Utah Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 404, reproduced in Addendum A, are
relevant to this appeal.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant, Verbery Adams, with one count each of
attempted murder with injury, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-203(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008), and attempted murder, a second degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2008). R.l-3.
Before trial, Adams requested notice of any evidence that the State intended to
introduce pursuant to Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. R.12. Fifteen days
before trial, the State provided written notice that it intended to introduce
Adams 7 1995 murder conviction "in order to establish knowledge, intent, and
absence of mistake or accident in the event that Defendant testifies at the trial
and puts his knowledge or intent at issue." R.40 (a copy of the State's notice is
included in Addendum B). The notice included a certified copy of Adam's prior
conviction. R.42-48 (a copy of the conviction is attached in Addendum C). The
State provided a second copy of the conviction in a supplemental response to
Adams' discovery request. R.50. The State also listed the prior conviction on its
exhibit list. R.55.
A bench trial was held. R.61-63, 85:1-253. Before trial, the parties argued
the admissibility of Adams' prior conviction under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence.

R.85:6-ll (a copy of the transcript of this argument, and the trial

court's ruling, is included in Addendum D). The trial court ruled that while it
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might not have admitted the evidence in a jury trial, the evidence would not be
unfairly prejudicial in this bench trial. R.85:ll.
During the State's case-in-chief, the investigating officer testified that
Adams had admitted that, in 1995, he was convicted of murder in Illinois for
killing someone with a car.

R.85:8, 208.

Defense counsel objected that the

statement was hearsay and that "the State has other methods of introducing
this."

R.85:208.

The prosecutor then moved to admit the certified copy of

Adams' Illinois murder conviction. R.85:208-09 (copies of the these transcript
pages are included in Addendum E).

The trial court admitted the exhibit,

explaining that it had already ruled that it was admissible. R.85:209.
The trial court convicted Adams of attempted murder with injury, but
acquitted him of attempted murder.

R.85:248-50 (a copy of the trial court's

explanation of its verdict is attached as Addendum F). The trial court sentenced
Adams to serve three years to life in the Utah State Prison. R.73. Adams timely
appealed. R.75.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
The fight
The victim, Allan Saena, was attending a party at his cousin's West Valley
apartment. R.85:103,159,170. Another of Allan's cousins —Gary Saena, attended
the party with his fiance, Jennifer Tafi. R.85:22-24, 60, 160. Other cousins and
friends were also there. R.85:22-24, 60, 160. As he arrived, Allan encountered
Defendant, Verbery Adams, outside. R.85:160. Adams said something to Allan
that Allan could not understand, but he suspected Adams "was maybe talking
crap" to him. R.85:161. Allan disregarded Adams and continued on into his
cousin's apartment. R.85:160.
At the party, Allan became drunk and upset and decided to leave.
R.85:161, 170. On the sidewalk outside the apartment, he encountered Adams
talking to one of Allan's female cousins. R.85:161. Allan confronted Adams and
their interaction quickly escalated into a fight. R.85:161.
Allan threw the first punch. R.85:161. Many of the partygoers quickly
joined the fight, some throwing punches, others trying to quell the melee.
R.85:26-27,163. The fight lasted five to ten minutes. R.85:174.

1

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's verdict.
See State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, 1f 1 n.l, 76 P.3d 1173 ("'On appeal from a
bench trial, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
findings'" (quoting ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 250 n.l (Utah
App. 1997)).
5

Adams hits Gaiy with his SUV and then runs over Allan
Gary and Jennifer left the party as the fight ended, around 2:00 am.
R.85:22, 25-26, 61, 63-64. As they crossed the street towards their car, Adams was
driving towards them in his SUV, a BMW X5. R.85:34-35,111-12,165,182. When
Gary was in front of Adams' SUV, Adams "gassed it." R.85:67. Gary jumped,
trying to avoid being hit, but ended up rolling over the SUV's hood and
bouncing off the driver's side windshield. R.85:68. Relatively unscathed, Gary
chased after Adams.

R.85:69.

Others, including Allan, joined in the chase.

R.85:29,165.
Allan ran in front of Adams' SUV and pounded on the hood, trying to get
Adams to stop. R.85:70, 165. Adams did not stop and ran Allan over. R.85:2930, 70,165.
Adams runs over Allan again
As Allan lay in the middle of the street, Gary ran to him and held him.
R.85:72. Meanwhile, Adams circled around the apartment complex in his SUV.
R.85:211. Gary then saw Adams' SUV coming back around the corner towards
him and the injured Allan. R.85:73. Jennifer also saw Adams' SUV approaching
again and yelled to Gary. R.85:30, 73. Gary tried to drag Allan out of Adams'
path but he was too late. R.85:73. Adams ran over Allan again, driving over his
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legs at about the knees. R.85:30, 73, 92. Both Gary and Jennifer saw Adams run
over Allan the second time. Id.
A security guard, Mike Salisbury, responded to a call about the fight and
followed Adams as he drove around the complex the second time. R.85:142.
Salisbury estimated that Adams was traveling thirty to forty miles an hour.
R.85:146. From his position, Salisbury did not see Adams hit anyone, and he did
not see Allan in the road as he passed. R.85:148, 150. However, he did notice
several people yelling and pointing at Adams' SUV. R.85:144. Adams drove
some distance past the group and stopped; Salisbury stopped in front of Adams.
R.85:144.
Adams flees
Adams got out of his vehicle yelling that he had been assaulted. R.85:145.
Salisbury directed Adams to stay by his vehicle while he talked to the party goers
to find out what was going on. R.85:145. Instead, Adams drove away. R.85:145.
Officer David Greco of the West Valley Police Department interviewed
Adams later that day. R.85:207. Adams claimed that he had been assaulted and
was being chased by a group of males as he attempted to leave in his vehicle.
R.85:208, 211. He claimed that as he drove away he remembered that he had left
his girlfriend behind, so he circled around the apartment complex. R.85:211, 213.
Adams claimed that as he approached the area where the fight occurred, the
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other males spotted him and started to approach him, so he continued on.
R.85:213.

Adams could then see police cars begin to enter the apartment

complex. R.85:213. Adams explained that he spoke with the security guard, told
him that he had been assaulted, and then left. R.85:213. He did not wait for the
police, because he figured that there were enough witnesses to explain to police
what had happened. R.85:214.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling before this
bench trial that Adams 7 prior murder conviction was admissible under rule
404(b). The circumstances of the prior conviction were strikingly similar to the
facts of this case —in both 1995 and 2008, Adams intentionally hit another person
with his car as he fled from people who were pursuing him. The trial court
admitted the prior conviction for the proper noncharacter purpose of rebutting
Adams' claim that he lacked the requisite intent and knowledge in this case.
Given the distinctive and strikingly similar circumstances of the two crimes, the
prior conviction was relevant to these disputed issues even though it occurred
fourteen years earlier.
Additionally, because this was a bench trial, there was no risk that any
unfair prejudice would outweigh the prior conviction's probative value.
Concerns of unfair prejudice primarily arise in jury trials, not bench trials.
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Regardless, the prior conviction did not unfairly prejudice Adams, because the
trial court accorded limited weight to that evidence and acquitted Adams' on
count two.
In any event, any error in admitting the evidence was harmless because
the prior conviction had little, if any, impact on the trial court's verdict.

The

prosecutor did not rely heavily on the prior conviction. The trial court gave the
evidence little, if any, weight.

Additionally, the judge's explanation of his

verdict contains nothing that would support a conclusion that he relied on the
prior conviction.

The judge explained that he convicted Adams because he

believed the State's witnesses who testified that they saw Adams twice run over
Allan Saena. The judge also believed that Adams' flight was inconsistent with
his claim of innocence.
Point II. Adams demonstrates no error, let alone plain error, in the trial
court's ruling allowing the State to introduce the prior conviction during its casein-chief.

During the pretrial argument on the admissibility of the prior

conviction under rule 404(b), the parties agreed that intent was at issue and
defense counsel never argued that the evidence should be admissible only if he
first testified. The trial court's pretrial ruling, therefore, placed no condition on
when the State could introduce the evidence. Consequently, the trial court did

9

not err when it allowed the State to introduce the evidence during its case-inchief.
Although Adams now claims that he was surprised when the State
introduced his prior conviction during its case-in-chief, his actions at trial belie
that claim.

Defense counsel never claimed surprise below or requested a

continuance.

Rather, his comments suggest that he expected the State to

introduce the evidence during its case-in-chief.

In any event, Adams fails to

demonstrate how the trial would have been different had he not been allegedly
surprised. He also fails to demonstrate that his prior conviction influenced the
verdict.
ARGUMENT
L

ADAMS' PRIOR CONVICTION FOR INTENTIONALLY
KILLING ANOTHER WITH HIS CAR WAS ADMISSIBLE
UNDER RULE 404(B) FOR THE PROPER NONCHARACTER
PURPOSE OF REBUTTING HIS CLAIM THAT HE LACKED
THE REQUISITE INTENT AND KNOWLEDGE*
Adams claims that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling pretrial

that his prior murder conviction was admissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Appellant's Br. at 18-41.

He claims that the evidence was not

admitted for a proper, noncharacter purpose.

Id. at 19-26.

He asserts that

although the State offered the evidence to prove that he acted intentionally, "the

2

This point responds to Adams' Point II.
10

only plausible theory for admission of Adams' prior conviction is to show the
propensity to commit crime." Id. at 21. He also argues that the prior conviction
was irrelevant because it had no logical connection to this case and was too
remote in time.

Id. at 27-30.

He further asserts that the State presented

insufficient detail about the prior conviction to show that it was relevant. Id. at
30-32.

Finally, Adams claims that the probative value of the evidence was

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.
However, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ruling that
Adams' prior conviction for intentionally killing another with his car was
admissible. Adams' prior murder conviction was relevant to rebut his claim that
he lacked intent and knowledge.

Moreover, there was no danger of unfair

prejudice because this was a bench trial, rather than a jury trial. In any event,
any error in admitting the prior conviction was harmless because it does not
appear that the trial court relied on that evidence in reaching its verdict.
A. Evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b) to
prove noncharacter purposes, such as intent, so long as the
evidence's probative value is not substantially outweighed by
any danger for unfair prejudice.
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

11

Evidence of other bad acts is admissible under rule 404(b) if it meets a
three-part test. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, Tf f 18-20, 6 P.3d 1120 (citing
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f f 21-26, 993 P.2d 837); accord State v. Marchet, 2009
UT App 205, f 29, 219 P.3d 75. First, the trial court must "determine whether the
bad acts evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as
one of those specifically listed in rule 404(b)." Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, | 1 8 .
See also Marchet, 2009 UT App 205, % 29.
If the evidence is offered for a proper noncharacter purpose, the court
must then determine whether the bad acts evidence is admissible under rule 402.
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^ 19. Under rule 402, "all relevant evidence is
admissible except as otherwise provided in the rules." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT
60, If 41, 28 P.3d 1278. See also Marchet, 2009 UT App 205, % 29.

Relevant

evidence is evidence "'having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence/" Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59,
Tf 19 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 401). Unless the evidence of the other bad act "tends
to prove some fact that is material to the crime charged-other than the
defendant's propensity to commit crime-it is irrelevant and should be excluded
by the court pursuant to rule 402." Id. (citations omitted). See also Marchet, 2009
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UT App 205, f 41. In other words, the evidence must be relevant to the issues in
the case at hand.
"Finally, the trial court must determine whether the other bad act evidence
meets the requirements of rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence."

Nelson-

Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 20. See also Marchet, 2009 UT App 205, Tf 29. Rule 403
excludes relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403.
In sum, "evidence of prior misconduct is admissible under rule 404(b) if
the evidence is relevant to a proper, non-character purpose, unless its danger for
unfair prejudice and the like substantially outweighs its probative value."
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^f 41. A trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule
404(b) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Verde, 2010 UT App 30, \
14, 227 P.3d 840.
B. Adams' prior murder conviction was offered for a relevant,
noncharacter purpose — to prove his intent and knowledge.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion, because it admitted Adams'
prior murder conviction for proper noncharacter purposes.
To convict, the State had to prove that Adams intentionally attempted to
kill Allan Saena by running him over with his SUV, and that Allan suffered
13

serious bodily injury.

See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-203(2)(a), 76-4-102(2)(a)

(West Supp. 2008).
Adams agreed that his intent was at issue. During the pretrial argument
on the admissibility of the prior conviction, Adams' counsel acknowledged that
"the whole issue in this case is one of intent/ 7 R.85:9. Defense counsel's opening
statement put both Adams' knowledge and intent at issue. Counsel argued that
while Adams admittedly ran over the victim, he was "not even aware of it."
R.85:19.

Counsel also argued that Adams lacked the intent to be guilty of

attempted murder. He argued that while Adams may have acted recklessly in
"trying to get away" from a situation "he did not initiate," Adams was not guilty
of attempted murder. R.85:19. Counsel then reminded the trial court that "[t]he
State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to do this."
R.85:19. In his brief, Adams admits that "[t]he issue of intent was central to the
outcome of the trial." Appellant's Br. at 15.
The trial court properly recognized that the prior conviction was relevant
for the proper, noncharacter purposes proffered by the State. In this case, Adams
twice ran over Allan Saena as Allan pursued him following a fight.

The

circumstances of Adams' prior murder conviction were remarkably similar. In
Chicago, Adams was in his car fleeing from gang members when he intentionally
hit and killed one of them with his car. R.85:8, 9-10. In both instances, Adams

14

escaped what he perceived to be threatening situations by intentionally hitting
others with his car. R.85:8, 9-10, 29-30, 70, 73, 92.
The circumstances of both crimes are also distinctive. An individual does
not usually run over another with a car, let alone do so intentionally. For that
matter, an individual does not usually commit murder by running over the
victim with a car.
Adams asserts that "the only plausible theory for admission of Adams 7
prior conviction is to show the propensity to commit crime." Appellant's Br. at
21. On the contrary, the fact that Adams had previously killed someone who
was pursuing him by intentionally hitting the victim with a car was relevant and
probative to rebut his claim that he lacked the requisite knowledge and intent in
this case. In his closing argument, Adams 7 counsel disputed Adams' knowledge,
arguing that "it could be that Mr. Adams didn't know he ran over somebody[,]"
because he could have believed that he was simply running over a speed bump.
R.85:239-40.

Counsel also argued that Adams lacked intent

R.85:236.

He

argued, "[i]t might have been accidental. I think that it's likely that it was." Id.
Counsel also asserted that if Adams had really intended to kill Allan, he would
have taken better aim the second time, rather than just running over his legs.
R.85:236-37.

Counsel also argued that Adams was acting under extreme

emotional distress. R.85:238-40.

15

Absent evidence of the prior conviction, Adams 7 claim that he did not
know that he ran over Allan, or that he was merely acting recklessly or under
extreme emotional distress, was plausible.

This is particularly true where

Adams was fleeing from several individuals who had just beaten him up.
R.85:29,161,165. The prior conviction, on the other hand, suggested that Adams
would not be overwhelmed by the emotional nature of the situation and could
act intentionally in facilitating an escape from his pursuers.
Adams nevertheless contends that his prior conviction was irrelevant
because it was too remote in time. Appellant's Br. at 28-30. The acts supporting
Adams 7 Illinois murder conviction occurred in the fall of 1994, fourteen years
before his actions in this case. R.85:7, Exhibit 5 (Add. C). However, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the prior conviction was
still relevant.
"[Tjhe test for remoteness is not mechanical application/ 7

State v.

Featiierson, 781 P.2d 424, 430 (Utah 1989), abrogated on oilier grounds by State v.
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 489 (Utah 1997). Rather, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether
the other acts have 'clearly probative value with respect to the intent of the
accused at the time of the offense cliarged.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 701
F.2d 1340,1345-46 (11th Cir. 1983)) (emphasis in original).

16

As explained, the striking similarity between the two situations, and their
distinctive circumstances, made Adams' prior conviction particularly probative
of his intent in this case. Therefore, the prior conviction was not too remote. See
id.
Adams also contends that the State offered too little detail of the prior
conviction to allow the trial court to determine its relevancy. Appellant's Br. at
30-32. However, the details that the State provided were sufficient.

The trial

court knew that Adams was convicted of murder in Chicago for intentionally
hitting and killing with his car a gang member who was pursuing him. R.85:8, 910. The prosecutor also proffered that Adams had admitted to the investigating
officer in this case that the two crimes were similar. R.85:8, 10. Adams did not
dispute those facts. He only added that someone had threatened him with a
firearm in the Chicago case. R.85:226.
The trial court knew enough about the prior murder to properly determine
that it was relevant. Given the striking similarities to the facts of this case, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the prior conviction to be
relevant.

17

C The probative value of the prior similar conviction was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of any unfair prejudice
in this bench trial.
The prior conviction also passes the third step under rule 403. Rule 403
excludes relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence/'

Utah R. Evid. 403. Adams argues that the probative

value of his prior conviction was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Appellant's Br. at 32-35.
However, the fact that this was a bench trial undermines Adams' claim
that his prior conviction was unfairly prejudicial.

"The evil that rule 403 is

intended to combat, unfair prejudice, is primarily of concern during a jury trial."
State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, 942 P.2d 925, 930 (Utah 1997).
"The judge in a bench trial, . . . acting as a trier of fact, is presumably less likely
than a jury to be prejudiced by evidence of prior crimes, wrongs of acts." State v.
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989), abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 489 (Utah 1997). "'[B]ecause it can be safely assumed that
the trial court will be somewhat more discriminating in appraising both the
competency and the effect properly to be given evidence, the rulings on evidence
are looked upon with a greater degree of indulgence when the trial is to the court
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than when it is to the jury/" Id. (quoting State v. Park, 404 P.2d 677, 679 (Utah
1965)).
The record demonstrates that the trial court was not prejudiced by Adams'
prior conviction.

The trial court indicated that it would give little weight to

Adams' prior conviction.

Each time the trial court addressed Adams' prior

conviction it commented on the limited evidentiary value it was according it.
During the pretrial argument on admissibility, the trial court commented that "it
seems to me that really what counts in terms of his intent would be how he
conducted himself in this case, not how he conducted himself in the case 14 years
ago." R.85:ll. The judge then explained that although he was ruling that the
prior conviction was admissible, his "real concern during the course of this trial
is what transpired on October 4, 2008."

Id.

Later, when the prosecutor

introduced the prior conviction during its case-in-chief, the judge commented
that he was receiving it "to the extent it may or may not be helpful." R.85:209.
These comments demonstrate that the trial court accorded the prior conviction
little, if any, evidentiary weight.
Additionally, the trial court's verdict demonstrates that it was not
improperly influenced by the prior conviction.

Although the trial court

convicted Adams of count one for twice running over Allan Saena, it acquitted
Adams of count two for hitting Gary Saena. Had the trial court been improperly

19

influenced by the prior conviction it likely would have convicted Adams on both
counts.
In any event, the probative value of Adams' prior conviction was not
outweighed by the danger of any unfair prejudice in this bench trial.

Some

factors that may be considered in balancing whether the probative value of prior
bad acts is substantially outweighed by their potential for unfair prejudice
include: (1) the strength of the evidence that the defendant committed the other
bad acts; (2) any similarities between the crimes; (3) the time interval between the
two crimes; (4) the need for the bad acts evidence; (5) the efficacy of alternative
proof, if any; and (6) the degree to which the evidence is likely to "rouse the jury
to overmastering hostility." State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). See
also Marchet, 2009 UT App 205, t 44.
In light of the so-called Shickles factors, any potential for unfair prejudice
did not substantially outweigh the probative value of Adams' prior conviction.
First, as Adams recognizes, the evidence that he committed the prior
murder was strong because he was convicted of that crime.
Second, as discussed above, the prior conviction's circumstances were
strikingly similar to the charged crime and both crimes are distinctive.
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Third, as also discussed above, the interval between the two crimes, while
admittedly long, is not unduly remote given the similarities between the two
crimes and their distinctive nature.
Fourth, although the evidence was not crucial and the trial court accorded
it little weight, it was nevertheless needed. As Adams' recognizes, the State had
no direct evidence of his intent. Appellant's Br. at 15. The evidence was relevant
to refute Adams' claims that he lacked knowledge that he ran over Allan, that he
acted only recklessly, or that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional
distress.

Additionally, Adams argued that the State's witnesses were not

credible in claiming that he ran over Allan twice. R.85:16, 232. Had the trial
court not believed the State's witnesses on that point, the need for admission of
the prior conviction would have increased.
Finally, there was no concern that the prior conviction would arouse a jury
to overmastering hostility, because this was a bench trial.
In sum, while the probative value of the evidence, according to the trial
court, was not great, the danger of unfair prejudice was low because this was a
bench trial. See Featherson, 781 P.2d at 431 ("The judge in a bench trial,. . . acting
as a trier of fact, is presumably less likely than a jury to be prejudiced by
evidence of prior crimes, wrongs of acts.") The trial court, therefore, did not
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abuse its discretion in determining that the danger of unfair prejudice did not
substantially outweigh the probative value of the prior conviction.
D. Any error was harmless because the prior conviction had little,
if any, impact on the trial court's verdict.
Even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling pretrial
that the prior conviction was admissible, any error was harmless. This Court
"'will not overturn a . . . verdict for the admission of improper evidence if the
admission of the evidence did not reasonably [a]ffeet the likelihood of a different
verdict/" State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, ^ 34,163 P.3d 695 (quoting State v.
Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, ^ 26, 62 P.3d 444) (alteration by this Court). There was
little likelihood of harm in this case because " [e]rroneous admissions of evidence
are not as critical in a bench trial as where a jury is involved." State v. Rimmasch,
775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989). Here, the record demonstrates that the prior
conviction had little, if any, impact on the trial court's verdict.
The prosecutor did not heavily rely on the prior conviction.

She

introduced a copy of the prior conviction during the direct examination of the
investigating officer in this case. R.85:208-09; Exhibit 5 (Add. C).

However,

neither the prosecutor, nor the investigating officer, commented any further
about the prior conviction.

In fact, the prosecutor's next statement after

introducing the prior conviction was "So we're not going to talk about that
Chicago incident.

Okay?"

R.85:209.
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The prosecutor mentioned the prior

conviction only once during her closing argument. R.85:231. In one sentence she
argued "[a]nd with the fact that' he was convicted of killing some guy by car in
Chicago 15 years ago, 14 years ago, car is just the preferred weapon of this man."
Id.
Additionally, as explained above, the trial court indicated that it was
giving little, if any, weight to Adams' prior conviction.
Finally, nothing in the trial court's explanation of its verdict supports the
conclusion that the judge relied on the prior conviction.
mention the prior conviction in explaining his verdict.

The judge did not
R.85:245-53 (Add. F).

Rather, he explained that he was finding Adams guilty of count one — attempted
murder with injury of Allan Saena —for two reasons.

First, the judge found

Jennifer Tafi and Gary Saena to be "very credible" witnesses. R.85:246. Based on
their testimony, the judge believed that Adams "came around twice" and hit
Allan twice. Id. Second, the judge was persuaded by the fact that Adams fled
after being told to remain, and after realizing that police were arriving. R.85:24748. The judge explained, "in my mind if [Adams] had an axe to grind with these
people, and he had law enforcement there to back him up, it seems to me that he
would have stuck around and told the police what had occurred." R.85:247. The
judge continued, "[t]he second trip around, I believe that—I believe that Mr.
Adams was upset enough and angry enough that he intended to kill this guy.
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And I believe that beyond a reasonable doubt. I believe his intent was to do
that." R.85:248.
The judge acquitted Adams of count two, the attempted murder of Gary
Saena. R.85:248-49. He found that the State had not met its burden on that count
where the only evidence was that Gary jumped as Adams approached him in his
SUV, and that Adams hit Gary with the hood and driver's side windshield. Id.
Adams points to nothing in the trial court's verdict that would indicate
that the judge relied on Adams' prior conviction in reaching its verdict. Rather,
he asks this Court to assume that the prior conviction figured into the verdict
because it was offered to prove intent—the central issue in the case.

See

Appellant's Br. at 15-18. He further asserts that "it must be assumed" that the
trial court considered the prior conviction because it admitted evidence of the
prior conviction. See Appellant's Br. at 39.
But admitting evidence, and relying on that evidence to reach a verdict, are
separate and distinguishable acts. This Court cannot assume that the trial court
relied on the prior conviction simply because the trial court ruled that it was
admissible. Rather, the judge, acting as fact finder, retained discretion to assign
the prior conviction whatever weight he deemed appropriate, including no
weight at all. See Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Gralwm, 2008 UT App 207, \
13, 186 P.3d 1012 (recognizing that in a bench trial it is the trial court's role to
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determine the proper weight to be given the evidence); Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson,
448 P.2d 709, 712 (Utah 1968) (a "fact-trier . . . is not bound to slavishly follow the
evidence" and has the "prerogative to place his own appraisal upon the
evidence").
The trial court convicted Adams on count one because it believed the
State's witness's testimony that he ran over Allan twice, and because Adams
flight was inconsistent with his claim that he had not run over Allan
intentionally.

R.85:245-49 (Add. F).

conviction carried

little evidentiary

The judge believed that Adams' prior
weight

and

demonstrates that it relied on the prior conviction.

nothing in its

verdict

Therefore, any error in

admitting the prior conviction was harmless.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN ADMITTING
EVIDENCE OF ADAMS' PRIOR CONVICTION DURING THE
STATE'S CASE-IN-CHIEF, BECAUSE THE PRETRIAL RULING
ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE PLACED NO CONDITION ON
WHEN IT COULD BE ADMITTED; REGARDLESS, ADAMS
FAILS TO SHOW THAT ANY ERROR HARMED HIM3
Adams claims that the trial court plainly erred when it admitted his prior
conviction during the State's case-in-chief because his testimony was a condition
precedent to the introduction of his prior conviction. Appellant's Br. at 8-18.
However, Adams cannot demonstrate any error, let alone plain error, because
the trial court's pretrial ruling admitting his prior conviction placed no condition
3

This point responds to Adams' Point I.
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on when that evidence could be admitted. R.85:10-ll (Add. D). In any event,
Adams cannot demonstrate that he was unfairly surprised by the admission of
his prior conviction, or that admission of the evidence harmed him.
Below, Adams did not claim that he was surprised by the introduction of
his prior conviction during the State's case-in-chief, nor did he ever argue that
the prior conviction could not be introduced unless he first testified. R.85:6-ll,
208-09 (Add. D & E). He therefore argues on appeal that the trial court plainly
erred in allowing the State to introduce his prior conviction in its case-in-chief.
Appellant's Br. at 14-18.
" T o prevail under plain error review, a defendant must demonstrate that
[1] an error exists; [2] the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and
[3] the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome/"

State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App 50, \ 4, 228 P.3d 1255

(quoting State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, I f 19-20,192 P.3d 867) (alterations in original).
A. Factual background.
In a pretrial discovery request, Adams requested notice of any evidence
the State planned to introduce under rule 404(b). R.12. In response, the State
provided Adams written notice that it intended to introduce his prior conviction
for murder in Illinois. R.40 (Add. B). The notice was delivered fifteen days
before trial and explained that the State would introduce the prior conviction "to
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establish knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake or accident in the event that
Defendant testifies at the trial and puts his knowledge or intent at issue." R.40.
Before the bench trial began, the parties argued the admissibility of
Adams' prior conviction under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. R.85:6-ll
(Add. D). Adams' counsel argued that the prior conviction was inadmissible
under the rule. R.85:8-10. However, he acknowledged that "the whole issue in
this case is one of intent." R.85:9. Defense counsel never argued that, based on
the prosecutor's notice, the prior conviction should only be admitted if he first
testified.

Id. In fact, defense counsel never mentioned the State's rule 404(b)

notice. Id.
After hearing from both counsel, the trial court ruled that the prior
conviction was admissible at trial. R.85:ll. The judge explained that while he
"probably wouldn't allow" the evidence to be admitted in a jury trial, he would
in this bench trial.

Id.

The ruling placed no condition on when the prior

conviction could be admitted. Id.
During the State's case-in-chief, the investigating officer testified that
Adams "mentioned that he had a previous incident back in 1995 where he hit
someone." R.85:208. Defense counsel objected that the statement was hearsay
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and that the State had ''other methods" for introducing the evidence. 4 R.85:208.
The State then moved to admit the evidence of Adams' prior murder conviction.
R.85:208-09. The trial court overruled the hearsay objection and admitted Exhibit
5, a copy of Adams' prior conviction, noting that it had ruled pretrial that the
evidence was admissible.

R.85:209.

Defense counsel did not object to the

admission of the prior conviction on the grounds that he was surprised.
R.85:208-09.

Nor did he request a continuance to be able to prepare to address

the evidence. Id.
B. Adams demonstrates no error in the trial court's ruling
admitting the prior conviction during the State's case-in-chief.
Adams' plain error claim fails because he demonstrates no error in the trial
court's ruling admitting the prior conviction during the State's case-in-chief. He
argues that this ruling was erroneous because the trial court's pretrial ruling
allowed his prior conviction "to be introduced only in the event that Adams
testified/' Appellant's Br. at 11 (emphasis in original). Adams misrepresents the
record. The pretrial ruling on admissibility placed no condition on when the
prior conviction could be introduced. R.85:ll (Add. D).
The prosecutor's pretrial notice said that she intended to introduce the
prior conviction "in the event that Defendant testifies at the trial and puts his

4

The statement was not hearsay because it was an admission of a partyopponent. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
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knowledge or intent at issue/'

R.40. But defense counsel never argued that

Adams 7 testimony should be a condition precedent to the introduction of his
prior conviction. R.85:6-ll (Add. D). If defense counsel believed that the State's
notice made his testimony a condition precedent to the admission of his prior
conviction then it was incumbent upon him to say so during the pretrial
argument on the admissibility of the evidence. His silence waived any claim that
his testimony was a condition precedent to the admission of his prior conviction.
This is especially true where Adams conceded during the pretrial evidentiary
hearing that intent was at issue. Because the pretrial ruling admitted the prior
conviction unconditionally, Adams cannot demonstrate any error in the mid-trial
ruling allowing the State to introduce the prior conviction in its case-in-chief.
C. The State provided reasonable notice of its intent to introduce
the prior conviction.
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, required the prosecutor to provide
Adams "reasonable notice" of her intent to introduce the prior conviction. See
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). The State's notice satisfied the purposes of Rule 404(b)'s
notice provision.
Utah courts have yet to decide what constitutes "reasonable notice" under
Rule 404(b). Adams therefore relies on the advisory committee notes to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which explain that the notice provision in federal Rule
404(b) is intended "'to [1] reduce surprise and [2] promote early resolution on the
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issue of admissibility.'" Appellant's Br. at 11 (quoting United States v. Carrasco,
381 F.3d 1237,1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (in turn quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory
committee's note (1991))). The State's notice satisfied both of these purposes.
First, the notice allowed the trial court to resolve admissibility questions
early.

The parties argued and the trial court resolved the admissibility of

Adams' prior conviction under rule 404(b) before the bench trial began. R.85:611 (Add. D).
Second, the notice alerted Adams that the prosecutor intended to
introduce his prior conviction if he put his knowledge or intent at issue. R.40
(Add. B). Adams does not dispute that he put his intent at issue. See Appellant's
Br. at 15 (explaining that intent was "the heard of Adams' defense" and "central
to the outcome of the trial"). Moreover, as explained, the trial court placed no
conditions on the State's introduction of the prior conviction. Therefore, Adams
could not have been truly surprised when the prosecutor introduced his prior
conviction.
Although Adams now claims that he was, in fact, surprised because the
prosecutor introduced the prior conviction during the State's case-in-chief,
Adams' actions at trial belie his belated claim of surprise.

Adams' counsel's

failure to claim surprise or to request a continuance when the State introduced
the prior conviction demonstrates that the evidence did not, in fact, surprise him.
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Defense counsel never objected that the evidence could only be admitted if he
first testified, that he received inadequate or otherwise deficient notice, or that
the evidence otherwise surprised him. R.85:208-09. Rather, in objecting to the
officer's alleged hearsay, defense counsel commented that "the State has other
methods of introducing" the evidence. R.85:208. This comment suggests that
counsel anticipated that the State would introduce the evidence in its case-inchief. Moreover, when the prosecutor then introduced Exhibit 5, the copy of the
prior conviction, defense counsel did not object. R.85:208-09. Given his counsel's
failure to claim surprise below, Adams' belated claim of surprise lacks merit.
D. Adams fails to demonstrate that any error was harmful.
In any event, Adams cannot demonstrate that he was harmed by the
admission of his prior conviction. He does not detail what he would have done
differently to address his prior conviction. Nor can he demonstrate that his prior
conviction influenced the trial court's verdict.
Adams fails to specifically demonstrate how his trial would have
proceeded any differently

had he not been allegedly surprised by the

introduction of his prior conviction during the State's case-in-chief.

He claims

generally that he was not prepared to testify about his prior murder conviction
and was not able to investigate it, or prepare his own witnesses to explain it or
distinguish it from the circumstances of the present case. Appellant's Br. at 12-
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13,15. However, Adams fails to detail the specific testimony that he would have
offered had he known that the evidence would be admitted in the State's case-inchief. See id. He also fails to explain why he would not have known enough
about his own prior murder conviction to be able to address it through his own
testimony. Absent the specific details of the additional evidence or testimony he
would have introduced, Adams' claim of harm is merely speculative. Cf. State v.
Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) (holding that an "invitation to speculate"
about the impact of unspecified testimony "cannot substitute for proof of
prejudice" in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
In any event, as explained above, Adams cannot demonstrate that his prior
conviction played any part in the trial court's verdict.

See Point I.D, supra.

Therefore, Adams cannot demonstrate that he was harmed by any error in
admitting his prior conviction.
Adams argues that "this case warrants a shift of the burden to the State to
persuade this Court that the error was harmless." Appellant's Br. at 16. For
support, he relies on two cases, State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), and State
v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988). Id. at 16-17. However, neither Knight nor Bell
was a plain error case. Rather, they addressed preserved challenges to the State's
failure to give proper notice of evidence in discovery (Knight) or proper notice of
the charge (Bell). See Knight, 734 P.2d at 916; Bell 770 P.2d at 104-08. Because
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Adams must demonstrate plain error, he bears the burden of proving all three
components of a plain error claim, including harm. See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 2005
UT 49,Tf 18, 122 P.3d 566 (imposing burden of establishing plain error or
exceptional circumstances on appellant); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah
1993) (same).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted 13 September 2010.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence
inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute,
or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion,
or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions;
other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the
accused offered by the prosecution;
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged
victim was the first aggressor;
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases.
(c)(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation,
evidence of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible
to prove a propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
(c)(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be
a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense.
(c)(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise
admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

STATE'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO OFFER
EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 404

Plaintiff,
Case No. 081907684

-vsVERBERY ADAMS,

Judge WILLIAM BARRETT

Defendant.
The State of Utah, through its attorney, CHOU CHOU COLLINS, Deputy District
Attorney, hereby provides notice pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence 404, of the State's
intent to introduce other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence at trial. The State intends to
introduce Defendant's 1995 Murder conviction in the State of Illinois (Exhibit A) in
order to establish knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake or accident in the event that
Defendant testifies at the trial and puts his knowledge or intent at issue. Defendant, on
October 4, 2008, informed Detective Greco of West Valley City Police department that,
in 1995, he was convicted of Murder in Chicago for killing someone with a car.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2009.

CHOU CHOU COLLINS
Deputy District Attorney
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

Page 001

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
VS
VERBERY

NUMBER 94CR2665101

ADAMS

CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION
I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
id keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the
ectronic records of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that:
ie States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION
th the Clerk of the Circuit Court.
arging the above named defendant with:
720-5/9-1(A)(1)
F M
MURDER/INTENT TO KILL/INJ
720-5/9-1(A)(2)
F M
MURDER/STRONG PROB KILL/I
e following disposition(s) was/were rendered before the Honorable Judge(s):
/04/94 IND/INFO-CLK OFFICE-PRES JUDGE
94CR2665101 ID# CR100720134
/16/94 CASE ASSIGNED
FITZGERALD, THOMAS R.
/16/94 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/16/94 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/16/94 APPEARANCE FILED
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/16/94 DEFENDANT ARRAIGNED
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/16/94 PLEA OF NOT GUILTY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/16/94 ADMONISH AS TO TRIAL IN ABSENT
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/16/94 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
'01/94 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
'01/94 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
'01/94 MOTION DEFT - CONTINUANCE - MD
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
'0 8/94 MOTION FOR BAIL REDUCTION
'08/94 NOTICE OF MOTION/FILING
'13/94 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.

11/16/94 1701
11/16/94 1714

12/01/94

01/05/95
E
12/12/94 1714
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
VS
VERBERY

NUMBER 94CR2665101

ADAMS

CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION
I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
d keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the
ectronic records of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that:
e States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION
/13/94 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/13/94 MOTION FOR BAIL REDUCTION
S
2
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/13/94 BAIL AMOUNT SET
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/13/94 O/C ONLY REL DEF ON D BOND
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/13/94 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT
01/05/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/05/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/05/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/05/95 MOTION DEFT - CONTINUANCE - MD
01/30/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/09/95 MOTION TO ADVANCE
E
2
/09/95 NOTICE OF MOTION/FILING
01/11/95 1714
/11/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/11/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/11/95 MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
E
1
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/11/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT
02/07/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
./30/95 CASE ADVANCED
01/30/95 1714
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
./3 0/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
./30/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
./3 0/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT
02/07/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
>/07/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
1/01/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.

$

65000

$

65000
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1/07/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT
03/06/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
./16/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
./16/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
./16/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT
04/03/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/03/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/03/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/03/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT
05/03/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
»/03/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
./03/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
./03/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT
05/15/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
./15/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
I/15/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/15/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT
06/13/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/13/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/13/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/13/95 DEF DEMAND FOR TRIAL
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/13/95 MOTION STATE - CONTINUANCE -MS
07/05/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/05/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/05/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
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/05/95 DEF DEMAND FOR TRIAL
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/05/95 MOTION STATE - CONTINUANCE -MS
07/17/95
BERKOS, CHRISTY S.
/17/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
PORTER DENNIS J
/17/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
PORTER DENNIS J
/17/95 MOTION STATE - CONTINUANCE -MS
07/24/95
PORTER DENNIS J
/24/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
PORTER DENNIS J
/24/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
PORTER DENNIS J
/24/95 PG JW FINDING GUILTY
CALL
PORTER DENNIS J
/24/95 CONTINUANCE BY ORDER OF COURT
07/25/95
PORTER DENNIS J
/25/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
PORTER DENNIS J
/25/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
PORTER DENNIS J
/25/95 CONTINUANCE BY ORDER OF COURT
07/26/95
PORTER DENNIS J
/26/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
PORTER DENNIS J
/26/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
PORTER DENNIS J
/26/95 CONTINUED JURY TRIAL
07/27/95
PORTER DENNIS J
/2 7/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
PORTER DENNIS J
/27/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
PORTER DENNIS J
/27/95 CONTINUANCE BY ORDER OF COURT
07/28/95
PORTER DENNIS J
/2 8/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
PORTER DENNIS J
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/28/95 PRE-SENT INVEST. ORD, CONTD TO
07/28/95 1714
PORTER DENNIS J
/28/95 WITNESSES ORDERED TO APPEAR
07/28/95 1714
PORTER DENNIS J
/2 8/95 CONTINUANCE BY ORDER OF COURT
09/06/95
PORTER DENNIS J
/06/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
PORTER DENNIS J
/06/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
PORTER DENNIS J
/06/95 MOTION DEFT - CONTINUANCE - MD
09/11/95
PORTER DENNIS J
/11/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY
PORTER DENNIS J
/11/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE
PORTER DENNIS J
/11/95 MOTION DEFENDANT - NEW TRIAL
D
2
PORTER DENNIS J
/11/95 DEF SENTENCED ILLINOIS DOC
C002
9 YRS
PORTER DENNIS J
'11/95 CREDIT DEFENDANT FOR TIME SERV
337 DAYS
PORTER DENNIS J
'11/95 DEF ADVISED OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
PORTER DENNIS J
'11/95 ILL STATE APPELLATE DEF APPTD
PORTER DENNIS J
'11/95 LET MITTIMUS ISSUE/MITT TO ISS
PORTER DENNIS J
'05/95 NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED, TRNSFR
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2009

PROCEEDINGS
* *

*

THE COURT: This is State of Utah vs. Verbery Adams,
Case No. 081907684. May I have appearances, please.
MR. MACK: David Mack for Mr. Adams.
MS. COLLINS: Chou Chou Collins for the State.
THE COURT: 1WhatTs your pleasure? Do you want
opening statements?
MR. MACK: We do, yes, Judge, but I think the State
has a motion.
THE COURT: ThatTs right. We need to hear the 404(b)
motion.
MR. MACK: May Mr. Adams have a hand free so he
may —
THE COURT: He canft have a hand free, but he can —
THE BAILIFF: I'll move his hands.
THE COURT: — have them handcuffed in front of him.
Okay. We have this Rule 404(b) motion, Ms. Collins.
MS. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor. I have this — before
we start, I have this witness list and exhibit list. Would the
court like to have my original?
THE COURT: Sure. You can bring those up if you
would like. Thanks.
MS. COLLINS: And I have given a copy to the court
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reporter. And then I also marked exhibits according to that
number.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. COLLINS: And we have stipulation on the exhibit
No. 5 which we are going to argue right now.
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, the test, of course, of
that it's a conviction older than 10 years, as the court can
see. And the test of that is 404(b) . And the standard on
that, thereTs a three-step test as the court knows.
The first step is if it was a character evidence. In
this case it's not.
The second step it is relevant, yes, it is relevant
because the issue here we're trying to decide today is if
defendant intentionally ran over those two people. And so that
directly goes into the issue here for this prior conviction
because that's what he did back in 1995 and '94. I can't
remember which year.
THE COURT: It was '94 when I looked at the
information you provided.
MS. COLLINS: Okay. It's '94. Thank you.
And then the third part is that, then, is the
weighing test, the probative versus prejudicial. And I think
in this case it's definitely probative in this case because,
and this shows, and like the 404 (b) indicator shows lack of
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accident, lack of mistake, shows almost every single one listed
in 404(b) , it basically says, "To prove the motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, planned knowledge, identity
and absent of mistake or accident."
So, your Honor, all three tests, three steps were
satisfied based on the facts situation, based on the prior
conviction.

We believe that should be allowed.

And the

defendant already made a statement to the Detective Greco from
West Valley City who's going to testify today also that October
is a bad month because 15 years ago he was convicted of the
same kind of crime, and he did four years for doing that. And
he hit somebody with a car and he killed that person in Chicago
and because those people are coming after him, those gang
members were coming after him.

A lot like the case today in so

many aspects on so many levels, and we believe that should be
allowed.
THE COURT: Mr. Mack.
MR. MACK:

Well, your Honor, I think that — well,

first of all, there is the prior conviction.

And there are the

statements by Mr. Adams to the officer, but I don't agree that
—

I mean, I still think it!s far more prejudicial than

probative in this case.

That, I guess if you take the

statements Ms. Collins has alluded to for Mr. Adams to the
officer, he intentionally ran this person over and intended to
kill him.

That's —

those are his words to the officer.
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I think the issue here, and the State's kind of
glossing over that that's —

therefore, it should come in

because it's intent, knowledge, preparation, absence of
mistake, the whole idea of this case, the whole issue in this
case is one of intent.
We don't have the evidence of that yet.

I think that

it's highly, highly prejudicial to say, you know, to compare
those two things, one where there's conviction and one alleged,
not proven, and say that they happened and unfolded pretty much
the same way, that this is how he operates, when he's in
trouble, he runs people over.

I mean, that's what they are

asking, and I think that goes to character.
It's not a plan.

It's not —• I mean, you know,

something about the case, I think, from prior discussions, but
this whole incident at issue today is the result of Mr. Adams'
actions in extricating himself from a fight where he was laid
upon by several people, a varying number of people and tried to
get away. And that's —

there's nothing in his statement to

the officer that he saw these people and thought he had to hit
them, thought he should run them over to save his life.
There's nothing of that.

In fact, there won't be anything like

that.
It's a completely different burden.

It's similar

because there's a car, because there's an injury.

It's

dissimilar because the other one was a death and there was an
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intentional, the statement by him was intentional.
I think it's —

I don't think it would be the kind of

evidence that would be allowed to be heard by a jury or
considered.

I think it's just so highly prejudicial.

In fact, there's Utah case State vs. Schickles that
deals with some admissibility issues under 404(b) . And it's —
there's a line in there, I may not have it exactly correct, but
that it's —
here.

there's too much, there's too much information

Yes, there are same similarities, but it clouds the

issue.
And the State, if they brought some details, maybe a
factual summary of the other case or something else that would
show, you know, more similarities than what's at issue here,
then maybe, but I think it's presumptively inadmissible.

And I

don't think they've surmounted enough of the obstacles here to
have it be before this court.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. COLLINS:

Well, go ahead.

Your Honor, I just want to quickly

address, I believe in the interview defendant did say 14 years
later the same thing.

So in his mind he was thinking is the

same thing, happened again as though he did it, one, and he did
it before.

And based —

THE COURT: Now, I think —
where you are coming from.

I understand that that's

14 years ago he engaged in the same

kind of conduct as alleged in the cases before me today, but on
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the other hand, it seems to me that really what counts in terms
of his intent would be how he conducted himself in this case,
not how he conducted himself in the case 14 years ago.
MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, that's true. However,
according to 403 is the weighing test, that the probative value
has to be substantially outweighed for the prejudicial —
THE COURT: ITm not sure in my mind that it would be
prejudicial in terms of my being the judge in this case. With
the jury I probably wouldn't allow it. I think because —
because I?m sitting here, and Ifm going to be the finder of
fact, I!m going to grant your motion and allow the information
to came in on the prior conduct. But I want to assure
everybody that my real concern during the course of this trial
is what transpired on October 4, 2008. Okay?
MR. MACK: All right.
THE COURT: Let!s go.
MS. COLLINS: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you want to do an opening statement
or —
MR. MACK:

I do.

MS. COLLINS: You do? Then I better do it then.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, this incident happened on
October 4th first thing in the morning, 2008, last year.
THE COURT: Was it October 4?

Addendum E

A.

I observed that he had, I believe his upper right lip

was swollen during the interview.

And I noticed that.

didn't observe any other injuries on him.

I

He did complain of

some soreness in his rib cage. And I looked, but I didn't see
anything, anything that stood out.
Q.

Is there anything significant that he told you during

the interview, without going through the details of everything?
A.

Yes. He mentioned that he was driving the vehicle.

He indicated that he had been assaulted during a fight that had
taken place at the Shadowbrook Apartments.
details on kind of what led up to the —
place.

He went into the

when the assault took

And that he had gotten into his vehicle to try to leave

the area and stated that he was —

he didn't think he hit

anybody, but that he was confused from the assault.

He then

mentioned that he had a previous incident back in 1995 where he
had hit someone.
MR. MACK:

Judge, I object to this.

State has other methods of introducing this.
I don't know —

I think the
This is hearsay.

I don't know if there's an exception to it.

I

don't think.
MS. COLLINS:

It's a statement against interest.

Your Honor, at this point, the State offers State's Exhibit
No. 5, which is a certificate of Cook County Illinois, People
of the State of Illinois vs. Verbery Adams.

It's a certified

statement of conviction/disposition, Case No. 94CR2665101 where
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defendant was convicted murder/intent to kill/injury.
THE COURT: Okay. Ifm going to overrule your
objection. Ifve already told her that I will allow Exhibit 5.
So it will be received. Are you offering it?
MS. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Five is received to the extent it may or
may not be helpful.
(State's Exhibit No. 5
Was received into evidence.;
Q.

(BY MS. COLLINS) So we're not going to talk about

that Chicago incident. Okay?
A.

Okay.

Q.

So we're talking about what happened.

So did

defendant tell you why he was at that Shadowbrook Apartment
complex that night?
A.

Yes. He was hanging out with two individuals that he

had just recently met, kind of having a party at their
residence. And he was there for a little while before leaving,
attempting to leave.
Q.

Did he tell you how often he goes there?

A.

I believe he mentioned that he'd gone there a couple

of times. These were people he recently met.
Q.

I'm going to ask you about your interview with Ula.

A.

Okay.

Q.

Okay? Do you remember the interview with Ula?
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Addendum F

Addendum F

Addendum F

So he was assaulted by that group. He put in that
point, made it sound like he was defending himself. And he was
trying to leave, which probably was partially true. But then
when the security person says, "You stay there. ITm going to
go check this out." He took off. Why? He was fleeing from
the scene because he didn't want to have to face the police and
the security people because if he knew what he did. It's the
guilt conscience right there. And that's what he did.
And he knew plainly what he was doing at that point.
He ran over the guy twice. We're lucky we're here today. The
guy survived. And he hit Gary when he was trying to hit Gary,
trying to run over him with the big X5.

That's the intent

right there.
So we believe that intent is demonstrated by the
testimony, by the event of what happened, laid out by all the
witnesses here, by the circumstances, by the map, the court can
see, and we believe intent was demonstrated by that.
THE COURT: Well, it's interesting that we perceive
things differently, but let me tell you what my take is on this
thing.
I thought that Jennifer Tafi, I think her last name
was, was very credible. I'm clear about that. And I realize
that under circumstances like this, people's perceptions
certainly do vary. But I felt that she was credible. And I
believe based upon her testimony, and Gary's also, when he was
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describing how he was holding his cousin in the street, he
could hear somebody screaming, the car was coming again, and he
was trying to drag him off, I felt there was credibility there.
I felt a little hostility, obviously, while he was testifying.
I don't know what that's all about. Maybe he just doesn't like
police and other things that goes on, who knows, but that's not
the point.
So those two were very credible to me. And I believe
that the evidence supports a finding beyond a reasonable doubt
that that occurred, he came around twice.
Now I'm going to go a little bit farther with this.
I know that Mr. Mack made a big issue out of a variety of
things, one of them which was the security guard. And
believing — the security guard had no reason to tell me a
story, I don't think. I think he was just telling what he
recalled.
And what sticks in my mind are a couple of things.
Mr. Salisbury receives the call. He comes back to the
Shadowbrook Apartments. He pulls into the main drive. He sees
this SUV coming at him, who then makes a quick turn around and
takes off, and he follows him. And he's following, he says
three to four feet. Well, that's pretty close when he says
they are going 30 to 40 miles an hour. But there's no doubt in
my mind that he followed this vehicle. Whether he was three to
four feet, who knows. Not that that's a real issue, but the
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speed is certainly significant.
And if I take that testimony, and I take a look at
the testimony of Detective Greco about what Mr. Adams told him,
that he had come around, he was going out, he decided that he
had to pick up his girlfriend, which he doesn't seem to make a
whole big effort in doing so, and he comes back around. And
then when he arrives at that point where he pulls down that
little alley after passing the place where the speed bump was,
he stopped, but I think he stopped because the security guard
blocked him off.
And that's when he got out and spoke to the security
guard about being in this fight; being assaulted.
And the interesting thing to me is, if I had been
assaulted, I would imagine I'd be angry. I'd be really upset,
particularly when there's more than one person, so you are
really at a disadvantage.
So I can see Mr. Adams was probably angry, really
upset, and he knew he did something wrong. And I think he —
well, I'll get to that in a minute. And then he left when he
was told to remain.
And in my mind if he had an axe to grind with these
people, and he had law enforcement there to back him up, it
seems to me that he would have stuck around and told the police
what had occurred. And you can't tell me that he didn't know
that he ran over this fellow. I don't care if he went over a
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speed bump after he hit him the first time, he knew.
Now we — and so I hear this story. I hear this
story from the detective, and from the security guy. I'm
thinking, hmm, that seems a little bit odd to me.
The second trip around, I believe that — I believe
that Mr. Adams was upset enough and angry enough that he
intended to kill this guy. And I believe that beyond a
reasonable doubt. I believe his intent was to do that.
And I think I've kind of gone over the reasons why I
believe that. I think people view things differently. People
act differently.

I can — Ula, why she said what she said and

why she got involved in telling a story that didn't make a
whole lot of sense when she sat here in court and told a
different story, and then couldn't remember what she told the
detective, you know, that's too bad. But I think there's
sufficient evidence that rises to the level that I believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that he attempted to kill the victim
in this case. So I'm going to find him guilty of Count I.
With respect to Count II, I think that's a little
fuzzy. He may have been hit by the mirror. That's what was
reported first. Now the story I hear today is that he jumped
up in the air and he was hit by the driver's side windshield.
And I don't recall whether it was a left or right side, but I
don't think that's — I don't think that's significant enough.
And I do not feel that the State's met its burden on that
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charge, and that charge is dismissed.
MR. MACK:

Your Honor, could I ask for just same

clarification?
THE COURT:
MR. MACK:
4 might apply.

You may.
Still wondering about how this subsection

Itfs still intentional. Attempted, it's an

affirmative defense to an attempted murder that someone causes
or attempts to cause the death of another under the influence
of extreme emotional distress or —
THE COURT: Well, I don!t have any evidence that he
was under extreme emotional distress.
MR. MACK:

Well, it seems maybe I misunderstood your

statements that he was very, very —
THE COURT: Angry.
MR. MACK:

—

THE COURT:

angry.

I don't know that's extreme emotional

distress, though.
MR. MACK:

Okay.

THE COURT:

That's my view.

I see a distinction

between anger, being mad at people who just assaulted him and
being so upset he doesn't know what's going on.

I don't buy

that.
MR. MACK:
calls for.

Well, I'm not sure that that's what it

If someone is angry about being assaulted by a

group that outnumbers them, and there's still some of them
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around —
THE COURT: If you can give me some cases that would
explain otherwise, but if that were the case, he should have
gotten out of town. He should have just left. He didn't.
MR. MACK: Well, but that's ~ that's not ~ the
statute doesn't contemplate not leaving because it sometimes —
THE COURT: It gives him the right to came back
around and run over this guy again?
MR. MACK: No, I'm not saying it does, your Honor.
I'm just thinking, I'm just arguing that that, that that, that
what the Court has stated about his being upset and knowing
that there's still some people around that were part of this
assault on him, it's not enough to be a complete affirmative
defense, assaultive defense. But I think it fits in the — it
fits into —
THE COURT: I see a distinction, I truly do, between
extreme emotional distress and the opportunity to leave and the
failure to do so. I mean, I can see a distinction there.
MR. MACK: And I don't know — and I'm not going to
persuade —
THE COURT: Let's put it this way. Let's say that he
did it. He ran over him the first time and then he threw it in
reverse and backed up.
MR. MACK: Yeah.
THE COURT: I could buy, I think, extreme emotional
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distress because you are looking at that kind of conduct and
wondering what in the world is going on. But he drives out,
he's going to exit, and then he comes back around, he tells
some story about picking up his girlfriend, and he doesn't pick
lip his girlfriend. And then he comes back through again —
MR. MACK: Right, but that's —
THE COURT: I see a distinction.
MR. MACK: And I'm not — if I could say a couple of
things.
THE COURT: I understand.
MR. MACK: "When he comes back around, the same people
are still there and they were in pursuant.
THE COURT: What's he doing there? See.
MR. MACK: I don't know.
THE COURT: And the distinction I see is extreme
emotional distress where one thing occurs, and then all of a
sudden something else occurs, a negative thing, within moments,
within moments, not within four, five minutes or 10 minutes or
however long it may have transpired.
MR. MACK: And I don't know that's — that anyone
suggested it was that length of time. They said it happened so
fast they couldn't get the guy out of the way.
THE COURT: Well, and that's true. But his story was
so different. I mean, he didn't — his story was I'm looking
for my girlfriend. And I pull around and I pull in this one
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area, and then I come back. I don't know. His story was not
consistent with what the security guard testified.
Anything else?
MR. MACK: Well, one final thing, Judge. There's
just — there was no testimony whatsoever that he swerved at
these people, on round two, that he swerved.
THE COURT: Well, the testimony I heard from the
victim was I'm standing in front of the car.
MR. MACK:

I'm talking about the second time, when

they're — according to the drawing, right in the middle of
that road.
THE COURT: They are in the road.
MR. MACK: And he doesn't swerve toward them. He —
THE COURT: He goes right over the top of him.
MR. MACK: Well, legs. I mean, if he's trying to
kill these guys, he's not — and a guy is sitting on the
ground —
THE COURT: Well —
MR. MACK:

I see it differently.

THE COURT: I know we do. I know we do. And that's
why they have appellate courts.
MR. MACK: Well —
THE COURT: You may be absolutely right, but I'm
telling you how I'm seeing it.
MR. MACK: Well, I — I know. You're the trier of
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fact. It's —
THE COURT: All right. Anything else?
MS. COLLINS: No, your Honor. I don't feel the court
needs to explain. The jury doesn't need to explain.
THE COURT: What do we need to do on sentencing?
MR. MACK: I guess get a presentence report.
THE COURT: You waive the maximum time?
MR. MACK: He would.
THE COURT: Let's do it on August 17 at 9:00 a.m.
MS. COLLINS: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. MACK: Thank you, Judge.
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
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